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Abstract: Many African economies have experienced rather dismal 
industrial development since the 1980s. The consensus view is that African 
firms lack competitiveness in a world with increasing trade openness. What 
determines competitiveness?  A well-known explanation is that resource 
endowments in Africa favour land not labour, which result in high wages, 
especially in comparison to „labour abundant‟ Asian economies. This paper 
examines the validity of this view on the basis of the case of Sudan. We 
demonstrate that the lack of competitiveness of manufacturing industries is 
not caused by high wages. Assuming a direct relationship between labour 
productivity and international competitiveness, we argue that acute capacity 
underutilisation, caused by supply-side constraints, lowers manufacturing 
productivity which in turn negatively influences competitiveness. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Interest in industrial development subsided with the rise of free market 
economics in the 1980s and 1990s. The era in which industrial development has 
been de-emphasised has coincided with a notable deterioration or stagnation of 
manufacturing activities in many African countries (Jalilian and Weiss, 2000, 
Nourbakhsh and Paloni, 2000). A number of well acknowledged studies in the 
literature attribute the underdevelopment of the manufacturing sector in Africa, 
either implicitly or explicitly, to wages being high especially in comparison to 
some Asian economies such as China and India. This is based on the view that 
resource endowments of African economies are in favour of land rather than 
labour.   
This paper disputes the arguments that manufacturing wages in African 
economies are relatively high and that this in itself is an obstacle for industrial 
development. Taking the relationship between labour productivity and 
competitiveness as given, we demonstrate that it is not high wages but low 
productivity levels that place African economies in a disadvantageous position in 
international as well as in national markets. An important cause of the depressed 
labour productivity is the acute capacity underutilisation rates in manufacturing. 
While low capacity utilisation is often associated with business cycles and 
demand fluctuations, persistent supply-side constraints such as inadequate 
infrastructure services, finance and skill base are perhaps more important.  
The evidence in this paper comes from Sudan, which in many ways is ideal 
for analysis. It has a large land to labour ratio in comparison to Asian economies. 
It has been plagued with structural economic constraints as well as civil wars like 
some other African countries.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature on the topic and highlights a number of controversial arguments. 
Section 3 specifies the links between three key indicators: competitiveness, labour 
productivity and capacity underutilisation. These issues are examined empirically 
in Section 4 presents an empirical analysis of key manufacturing indicators in 
three countries: Sudan, India and China. We show that the slow progress in 
Sudanese manufacturing is associated with low productivity levels but not with 
high wages. Further, we discuss the determinants of labour productivity in Sudan 
by using a cross-section regression analysis and demonstrate that a crucial reason 
for poor productivity is the severe and long-term capacity underutilisation, which 
is associated with a host of supply-side constraints. 
 
2. What are the causes of industrial underdevelopment in Africa? 
 
The literature on industrialisation can be divided into two distinct strands. 
The first deals with industrial development in a closed economy context with 
emphasis on economic structures, resource constraints and endowments 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Hirschman 1958, Lewis 1954, Kaldor 1966 and 1967). 
Complemented by „the infant industry argument‟ in international trade, this 
literature underpinned the crucial role of industrialisation for growth and 
development. The second strand of the literature is inspired by the comparative 
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advantage theory of trade, which has stressed efficient allocation of resources and 
international division of labour in production rather than industrialisation per se. 
At the level of implementation, both of these perspectives have had limited 
success in Africa. For the former, financing imported investments and raw 
materials, identification of sectors or activities to protect, and to what extent and 
for how long to protect have been problematic. In practice, many countries 
applied an indiscriminate protectionist diet for prolonged periods, which went far 
beyond what the term „infancy‟ implies. In the absence of monitoring 
entrepreneurial efforts to grow out of „infancy‟, enterprises remained reliant on 
protection by the state. The second view has also had little success in Africa. 
Restrictions on access to developed country markets, a more competitive 
international market for the exports of the developing world (UNCTAD, 2002), 
supply-side constraints and the importance of non-price factors for 
competitiveness (Roberts and Thoburn, 2003) are some of the reasons for the 
failures of the liberalisation programs.  
In a world of increasing openness in international trade, industrial 
development without a competitive edge is a difficult task. This is why most 
recent studies discuss industrial development in the context of international 
competitiveness. Survival of firms in different industries in each country requires 
them to show the ability to, at least, retain and ideally expand their market share 
in overseas and / or domestic markets in the presence of competing foreign firms. 
While competitiveness is closely related to the performance of the firms, its 
aggregation at sectoral or national level can be useful for policy-making purposes 
since the performance of firms in any country is influenced by a common set of 
incentives, factor markets, institutions, business cultures and norms (Lall, 1998).  
Therefore, it is not unusual to observe a generalised failure or success of firms in 
a particular industry to enter or expand their share in the world and domestic 
market. Such trends do not only shape the path of industrial development but also 
the prospects for economic development.  
What determines competitiveness that plays such a crucial role in industrial 
development? The ingredients that contribute to competitiveness are manifold. 
For example, the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) (2007-2008) takes into 
account institutions, infrastructure, health and education, market size, depth of 
financial markets, technology and innovation. In development economics, a 
prominent stance on this question was established by Sanjaya Lall (1998). For 
him, the level of competitiveness and industrial development of nations depended 
on their technological capabilities which in turn were determined by the amount 
of investment in research and development and human capital base.  
The empirical studies on African industrial development, on the other hand, 
consider the lack of competitiveness in Africa to be a result of the paradox of high 
wage-low productivity, stemming from disadvantageous resource endowments. 
For example, Wood and Berge (1997) and Owens and Wood (1997) argued that 
the low skill-land endowment ratio in African countries leads to a loss of 
competitiveness through high wages in manufacturing, which requires more skills 
relative to land. Similarly, Teal (1999) argued that the failure of African 
manufacturing in international markets may lie in wages being too high relative to 
productivity. In a more comprehensive analysis with a structuralist perspective 
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Karshenas (2001) pointed to the lack of labour surplus relative to land, and he too 
ended with a similar conviction.  
 “In Asia, the non-agricultural sectors have had an access to an 
abundant supply of wage labour at wage rates that are a fraction of 
the average product of labour in agriculture, and with a relatively 
elastic supply. In sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, the 
opportunity cost of labour or the reservation wage for the non-
agricultural sector is close to the average product of labour in 
agriculture.” (Karshenas, 2001: 323)   
While it is true that manufacturing sectors in Africa are generally not 
competitive in international markets (Jallilian et al. 2000), it is disputable that 
relatively high wages are at the root of this problem. The point about wages being 
too high for whatever reason is not particularly enlightening because with low 
productivity any element of production costs (including capital, raw materials and 
wages) will appear high in comparison with the total value of output produced. 
Neither is this point useful for policy making purposes to the extent that it implies 
a suggestion for a downward wage adjustment to enhance competitiveness in 
environments where manufacturing wages are already very low.  
 
 
3. Competitiveness, labour productivity and capacity utilisation: Specifying 
the linkages    
 
In the literature of economics, various measures are used for competitiveness. 
These include export shares (Kravis and Lipsey, 1992), total factor productivity, 
unit labour costs, relative output prices (Rao and Tang, 2004), relative export 
prices (Durand, et al. 1992), and changes in real exchange rates. The most 
frequently used measure of competitiveness, however, is productivity, especially 
labour productivity, especially labour productivity, because: 
 „Prosperity is determined by productivity …which depends 
both on the value of a nation‟s products and services, measured 
by the prices they can command in open markets, and efficiency 
with which they can be produced…True competitiveness, then, 
is measured by productivity …[that] supports high wages, a 
strong currency, and attractive returns to capital … Productivity 
is the goal, not exports per se or whether firms operating in the 
country are domestic or foreign owned‟ (Global Competiveness 
Report p. 52) 
In this paper, we also consider labour productivity in manufacturing to be a 
good aggregate measure of competitiveness since the determinants of the latter, no 
matter how broadly or narrowly defined (e.g. institutional quality, human capital, 
financial depth or unit production cost), are likely to influence the former. 
Labour productivity, on the other hand, is dependent on capacity utilisation 
rates though it is determined by factors such as skills and technology as discussed 
under 4.3.1. Consider that productivity is estimated as output per unit of factor 
input and that outputs and inputs are measured either in terms of quantity 
(produced or employed) or in constant prices so that we assume away the 
influence of changes in prices.   Assuming that labour and capital markets are not 
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fully flexible because of: a) adjustment costs, for example, associated with hiring 
and firing labour and b) uncertainty so that precise timing of such adjustments is 
difficult for firms.  
Under these conditions, capacity utilisation rates decline during economic 
downturn, taking the form of underutilised labour force or capital stock or both. 
This will lead to lower output per unit of capital or labour and relatively higher 
unit costs. Hence, the variation in capacity utilisation rates causes productivity 
measures to follow a cyclical trend as long as a full adjustment to cycles through 
variation in input use is not possible. It is well established in the literature that 
productivity measures show a cyclical pattern (Basu 1996; Hart and Malley 1999) 
in the manufacturing sectors of developed economies.  
What is peculiar, however, is that the causes of capacity underutilisation are 
not entirely the same in developed and low-income African countries. In the 
former group, it is associated to a large extent with demand related business 
cycles, which instigates a cyclical output and labour productivity pattern. In the 
low-income economies of Africa, on the other hand, capacity underutilisation is 
likely to be induced not only by demand-side factors but also supply-side factors. 
Indeed, as argued by Rand and Tarp (2002, p. 2084): 
“…supply-side factors are often the main source of output 
fluctuations in developing countries, and supply-side models are 
typically superior in helping to understand business cycle 
features.” 
The nature of supply-side constraints faced by African manufacturing firms is 
quite well established in the literature. For example, Tribe (2000) and Rattsø and 
Torvik (2003), Lawrence (2005) highlight the role of foreign exchange shortages 
that limited the capacity of African manufacturing firms to import essential inputs. 
Bigsten and Söderbom (2005), on the other hand, emphasize how lack of access to 
credit by African manufacturing firms limits the industrial development process. 
Others have highlighted inadequate infrastructure (Tribe 2000, Yumkella and 
Vinanchiarachi 2003), interruptions to the flow of inputs (Cramer 2000), high 
transaction costs (Collier, 2000) and political instability (Lall, 1995).  
These constraints explain the peculiar evidence from Africa that the growth of 
small firms is much slower than the growth of large firms, which contrasts with 
the evidence in the advanced capitalist economies (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 
2002, Van Biesebroeck 2005, Frazer 2005). This is because larger firms are likely 
to have better flow of inputs, better access to finance and foreign exchange and 
better solutions to the problems associated with infrastructure (e.g. private power 
generation facilities).   
These supply-side problems induce high capacity underutilisation, and hence 
low productivity and low returns to investment which erode the competitiveness 
of African firms both in domestic and international markets. Solutions to these 
problems could improve the acutely low capacity utilisation rates of existing 
manufacturing establishments. This in turn would increase output per worker for 
each establishment and improve their surplus over wages and material costs.  
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4.  The empirical analysis: The Case of Sudan  
  
Manufacturing activities in many African economies have declined since the 
1980s. Jalilian and Weiss (2000) provide some evidence for de-industrialisation 
in a sample of countries across the continent. More recent data from World 
Development Indicators (2007) show that the manufacturing value added (MVA) 
to GDP ratio has declined or remained stagnant since the mid 1970s in 17 out of 
27 countries for which data is available. 
 The experiments with different development strategies in Sudan have been 
futile too with little change taking place in the structure of the economy. Overall, 
the share of manufacturing value added (MVA) in GDP fluctuated around a 
narrow band of five per cent at the lower end and nine per cent at the top end 
(World Bank, 2007). The 2001Comprehensive Industrial Survey revealed that the 
share of the sector in total employment is less than two per cent, which is not 
significantly different from what it was in the early 1970s. This evidence leads us 
to conclude that long term manufacturing development in Sudan can, at best, be 
characterised as stagnant. 
 
Table 1. Composition of MVA and Employment in Sudan (per cent) 
ISIC Sector 
Composition 
of MVA 
Shares in  
employment 
1971 2001 1971 2001 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 45.8 ..66 37 57.2 
32 Textile, clothing & leather goods 26.1 264 32.4 9.1 
33 Wood and wood products 2.9 860 2.8 3.2 
34 Paper and printing 3.2 460 5.1 1.7 
35 Chemicals and products 17.1 6.61 8.2 5.9 
36 Non-metallic mineral products 2 462 4.1 12.7 
37-8 Basic metals and products 2.9 4 10.3 7.9 
39 Other manufacturing - 2 0.1 2.2 
      Source: Based on World Bank (1987) & The Comprehensive Industrial Survey (2001). 
 
 
Manufacturing activities are concentrated in a small number of urban centres, 
most prominently in Khartoum and Gezira States. The industry has a trivial 
presence in South Sudan. Overall, the sector maintained a narrow base with agro 
processing industries dominating the sector (Table 1). Food and tobacco 
processing is now by far the most important activity in terms of value added and 
employment.  
 
4.1. Are wages higher in Sudan relative to low-cost Asian economies?  
 
Are wages too high in Sudan in comparison to low-cost Asian economies 
such as India and China? What role do their differences in resource endowments 
play? To answer these questions, three sets of indicators are listed in Table 2. The 
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first set of data under „country characteristics‟ clearly shows that Sudan has the 
greatest advantage in terms of land per person but a disadvantage in terms of 
labour surplus. It has the lowest level of development in terms of per capita GDP 
and per capita manufacturing value added. 
As the estimates clearly show, in comparison wages in manufacturing are not 
particularly higher in Sudan. China has slightly lower wages per worker than 
Sudan but not India.  In fact, the average manufacturing wages given in Table 2 
translate into 3 to 3.70 US dollars per worker per day in PPP terms for all three 
countries.  These rates are not far from the international poverty threshold of two 
dollars a-day.  
 
  Table 2. Resource endowments and productivity in Sudan, India and China 
    (US$, constant 2000 prices)* 
 Sudan India China 
Country Characteristics 
Per capita GDP, 2004 448 538 1162 
Arable land per person, 2004 (hectares) 0.50 0.15 0.11 
MVA per capita, 2004 34 74 350 
Manufacturing Wages 
Average wages in manufacturing  (per annum) 
(1321) 
1250 
(875) 
1335 
(-) 
1104 
Share of wages in MVA (%) 
(22.7) 
23.4 
(35.6) 
14.7 
(-) 
12 
Manufacturing wages to AVA per worker (%) 
(450) 
210 
(330) 
330 
(-) 
310 
Productivity estimates 
AVA per hectare of arable land used 
(118) 
300 
(302) 
627 
(556) 
1311 
AVA per worker (per annum) 
(295) 
594 
(269) 
409 
(161) 
355 
MVA per worker (per annum) 
(5831) 
5351 
(2460) 
9109 
(1442)** 
9283 
Ratio of MVA to AVA per worker (%) 
(20) 
9 
(9) 
22 
(9) 
26 
Labor productivity growth in manufacturing 
(1971-72 to 1999-01, %) 
-8.2 370 644 
Source: Estimations are based on data from World Bank (2007) and UNIDO Statistics    
  (2005). MVA and AVA are manufacturing and agricultural value-added, 
respectively. Figures in brackets are for 1971-72. Figures without brackets are for 2001 
unless otherwise stated.  (*) Unless otherwise indicated. (**) The figure is for 1977. 
 
 
The estimates in Table 2 also raise questions   about the validity of the view 
that the opportunity cost of labour for manufacturing is determined by average 
agricultural incomes (Karshenas 2001). Assuming that value added per worker is 
the average income in the agricultural sector, real manufacturing wages relative to 
agricultural value added per worker  were much higher in „labour-abundant‟ India 
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and China (over three-fold) than in „land-abundant‟ Sudan (around two-fold) in 
2001 (the middle row of Table 2). In fact, manufacturing wages in comparison to 
agricultural wages in reality must be much higher in India and possibly in China 
than what our estimates in Table 2 suggest. This is because it is likely that 
agricultural value added per worker reflects the average agricultural incomes in 
Sudan as most agricultural households derive their incomes from small-scale 
subsistence farming.  On the other hand, the use of wage-labour in agriculture is 
common especially in India, which implies that wages in agriculture must be 
much lower than the agricultural value-added per worker. Hence, manufacturing 
wages relative to agricultural wages are likely to be higher.   
If average rural incomes reflect the opportunity cost of labour or the 
reservation wage for the non-agricultural sector, why are real manufacturing 
wages relative to agricultural incomes in India and China much higher than Sudan 
where agricultural value added per worker has been in fact greater? This is 
probably because the link between agricultural incomes and manufacturing wages 
is weak. In Sudan, for instance, there was a two-fold increase in agricultural 
productivity from 1971 to 2001 when in the same period real wages in the 
manufacturing slightly declined (Table 2). The loose link between incomes in 
manufacturing and agriculture is not surprising for two reasons. First, 
manufacturing wages have to reflect the dynamics of urban living costs (including 
housing, transport and utilities) of which food constitutes only a part. Second, this 
relationship may have become even flimsier with greater openness to trade in 
developing economies if some convergence between domestic and international 
price levels has taken place.  
What is indisputable however is that the growth of labour productivity in 
Chinese and Indian manufacturing has been so fast that in about two decades 
value added per worker rose by four to six times in these economies while it went 
down slightly (by about eight per cent) in Sudan (Table 2). On average, Chinese 
and Indian workers were over 40 per cent more productive in 2001. Hence wage 
levels in China and India are indeed very low once they are set against this 
remarkable improvement in labour productivity.  
The growth of labour productivity in Sudanese agriculture from 1971 to 2001 
does not compare favourably with India or China once the land area is taken into 
account. In China, arable land per person is only twenty per cent of that in Sudan 
and yet each agricultural worker produced more than half the value added by a 
Sudanese farmer.  This is mainly because the observed productivity increases in 
Sudanese agriculture have been due to the extension of the farmed land rather than 
the employment of modern cultivation methods (Mahran 2000, Ahmed and 
Sanders, 1998). In India, the proportion of irrigated cropland increased from 19 
per cent in 1971 to 34 per cent in 2002, while it went down from 14 per cent to 12 
per cent in Sudan in the same period. In 1971, Sudanese farmers consumed only 
seven per cent of the amount of total fertilizers used in China. Since then, 
fertilizer use increased by a mere 30 per cent in Sudan while it quadrupled in 
China and India (World Bank 2007).  
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4.2. Supply-side causes of high capacity underutilisation  
 
Capacity underutilisation rates in the manufacturing sector are unusually high 
in Africa. For example, a study of seven African economies shows that capacity 
underutilisation rates in some of these economies were as high as 55-60 per cent 
with a mean of 43 per cent and median of 48 per cent (Mazumdar and Mazaheri 
2003). In Sudan in some sectors over 90 per cent of installed capacity remained 
idle for some years (Table 3). Manufacturing of sugar and leather seem to be the 
only activities where the use of capacity was 60 per cent or more. A survey by the 
World Bank (2003) showed that capacity underutilisation was prevalent in about 
85 per cent of all factories on the largest industrial estate in Khartoum-North.  
 
Table 3. Average capacity utilization rates in Sudan 
   (Main industries, % of installed capacity) 
Sector 1985 1992 1995 1997 
Textile 30 15.0 0 10 
Oil milling 25 5.0 64 19 
Beverages 50 7.6 22 50 
   Sugar - 64.7 .1 74 
   Flour - 33.2 41 21 
Leather 60 60.0 .8 - 
Footwear 45 30.0 42 31 
   Tobacco - 26.9 60 28 
  Source: Ministry of Industry 
 
 Manufacturing industries in every country, irrespective of the level of 
development, go through phases of underutilisation as a result of the changes in 
demand and trade cycles. Undoubtedly, these factors exert similar influences on 
African manufacturing firms. Nevertheless, given the length and severity of low 
capacity utilisation rates in some African economies, it is unlikely that they 
merely reflect business cycles. Supply-side constraints are likely to be more 
important, as argued by Rand and Tarp (2002). Although Mazumdar and 
Mazeheri (2003) underplay the impact of supply-side factors on capacity 
utilisation rates, their definition of what constitutes the supply-side is rather 
narrow. For example, credit constraints faced by African manufacturing firms, 
which is indicated to be highly important for capacity utilisation rates in their 
study, are not considered as part of the supply-side. The study also omits the 
influence of inadequate infrastructure facilities.  
Understanding the dynamics of capacity utilisation in Africa is of great 
importance. Our research on Sudanese manufacturing leads us to focus on four 
important factors. The first is related to input supply problems as discussed 
extensively by Dagdeviren and Mahran (2004). Persistent scarcity of imported as 
well as locally produced inputs from the 1970s to the late 1990s led to the 
emergence of a huge black market for goods, services and foreign exchange. The 
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black market economy generated its own momentum whereby scarcity fuelled 
illegal activities and the latter in turn created more shortages.  
For example, the textile industry (yarn, fabric, blankets, garment producing 
units) failed to meet expectations despite enjoying the highest protection rate 
throughout the period (World Bank 1987). The sector registered a continuous 
deterioration both in terms of the quantity of output and real value-added since 
the 1970s. The erratic and inadequate supply of cotton to textile units has been 
one of the most important reasons behind this decline. No effort was spared at 
curbing raw cotton exports (representing 75 per cent of total production in the 
1990s) in favour of domestic textile units in the face of foreign exchange 
shortages until the end of 1990s. Furthermore, the price of cotton increased 
significantly due to poor marketing arrangements, which involved moving cotton 
from producers to Port Sudan (where firms make their purchases) and from Port 
Sudan to textile firms. Thus, except for medical cotton producing units, capacity 
utilisation remained very low in the sector. Of the 219 licensed textile units in 
Khartoum only 52 were operational in 1998 (UNIDO, 2003). Likewise, input 
supply was seriously constrained in the edible oils sector by official and illegal 
exports, which together accounted for 70 per cent of the crop produced. Annual 
demand in the edible oil sector was around 17 per cent, while actual production 
was five per cent of the installed capacity in 1993-1994 (MOI and MOF, 1995).  
Secondly, the rough and ready information on credit availability suggests that 
access to credit may be important in alleviating problems with the use of capacity. 
For example, total domestic credit provided by the banking sector was only 11.5 
per cent of GDP in Sudan during 2002-2003. This is very low in comparison with 
India where it was around 60 per cent of GDP and China where it was about 166 
per cent of GDP in the same period (World Bank, 2007). Long term credit 
provision to the industry is almost non-existent in Sudan. The share of industry 
(including sectors such as construction in addition to manufacturing) in total 
commercial credit stock was around 10-11 per cent during 2003 and 2004 (BOS, 
2004). 
Thirdly, infrastructure bottlenecks have further aggravated the circumstances 
for capacity utilisation. Northern Sudan is politically more stable and it 
accommodates around 98 per cent of manufacturing enterprises. Most agro-
processing firms experience sharp fluctuations in the supply of raw materials due 
to inadequate transport links. Poor supply of services such as telecommunications, 
power and water have had dire consequences for capacity utilisation rates in 
established industries. The share of production by the electricity and water sectors 
in total GDP, by far the most important infrastructure services, has remained 
around two per cent since the 1970s. Power failures have been a prominent cause 
of capacity underutilisation. Many enterprises have installed their own electricity 
generation systems in response to frequent power failures. The results of the 2001 
Industrial Survey suggest that private power generation for own use accounted for 
about 21 per cent of electricity used in the manufacturing sector.  
Finally, it is important to emphasize the disastrous consequences of the civil 
war especially in the South Sudan. Discord and hostilities between the people of 
African descent in the South and Arabs in the North have prevailed since 
independence with the exception of a peaceful period during 1972-1983. Civil 
war has led to the complete disappearance of manufacturing activities in the 
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South. According to the 2001 Comprehensive Industrial Survey, of the 24 
thousand manufacturing establishments only four hundred (or 1.8 per cent of 
total) are located in the Southern states of Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and 
Equatoria. The region has no activity whatsoever in 15 of the 22 main industries. 
The Sudanese government had very limited incentives to invest in civilian 
infrastructure in the South for it could benefit the rival factions or be destroyed. 
The roads that linked the North to the South (one from Juba via Malakal and the 
other via Wau) have been dysfunctional due to land mines, lack of resources on 
the part of SPLM and incentives on the part of government which has had no 
control over a large part of the South Sudan. Uganda and Kenya have been the 
main commercial links in the South. The transport cost of goods from 
neighbouring countries into South Sudan is around 230 per cent of their cargo-
insurance-freight (CIF) value (World Bank, 2005). 
An important question in this context is why the supply side problems we 
described above have caused capacity underutilisation rather than lack of 
capacity? Part of the answer to this question lies in the government policies 
pursued during the 1970s and early 1980s when it actively invested in 
manufacturing. The private sector has also invested in periods of relative political 
stability. Every manufacturing unit must meet a minimum scale of production for 
it to be economically viable. This is partly why, for example, the installed 
production capacity was approximately five times greater than the level of 
domestic demand in the edible oils sector (MOI and MOF 1995). Once 
established, the liquidation of the existing assets in the face of high capacity 
underutilisation is difficult for investors and the government. Finding buyers for 
facilities that operate at low capacity is difficult unless investors accept 
considerable undervaluation in their assets. Operating at lower capacity with a 
low level of profitability may be a better option than asset fire sales. However, 
new capacity creation in the 1990s has been very limited. On average around ten 
per cent of gross fixed investment was directed to the manufacturing sector in this 
period while over 65 percent went in to real estate (World Bank 2003). In fact, 
the 2001 industrial survey data indicate that new investment undertaken in that 
year was not sufficient for replacement of the depreciated capital stock in 55 out 
of 82 industries.         
Adjustment to supply side constraints can also be difficult through variation 
in labour use as well. While use of causal labourers, for example, may be a way 
of dealing with, say, power interruptions or input supply problems, the 
effectiveness of such practices in terms of capacity utilisation rates may be 
limited where the sector is  dominated by micro firms that often employ family 
labour as in Sudan. According to the 2001 survey, 36 per cent of the 
manufacturing value added is created by sectors with less than 5 workers, 
including family workers. 
 
4.3. Causes of poor productivity in Sudanese manufacturing 
 
In the previous section, we argued that depressed labour productivity is a 
crucial weakness in Sudanese manufacturing. Knock on effects of poor 
productivity on competitiveness in the domestic as well as world markets are 
likely to be restraining the overall development prospects of the manufacturing 
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sector. Our purpose in this section is to identify the determinants of productivity 
in Sudanese manufacturing through an econometric regression analysis.  
 
4.3.1. Method of estimation  
 
Labour productivity estimations are often derived from a Cobb-Douglas 
production function (i.e. Yit = Ai Kit
α 
Lit
 β
) and it is determined by capital intensity 
or capital-labour ratio. However, this approach suffers from some unrealistic 
assumptions. Most important is the assumption that capital and labour are perfect 
substitutes, implying that fixed capital is malleable, labour markets are flexible 
and the production technology could be changed easily. Estimates based on this 
functional form imply implausible relationships between key variables. For 
example, as shown by Rowthorn (1999), unemployment is found unaffected by 
investment, technical change or change in labour supply when estimations are 
based on Cobb-Douglas function. Changing the functional form to assume that 
the elasticity of substitution is less than unity, he shows that the equilibrium 
unemployment is affected by all the factors above. Moreover, growth accounting 
derived from Cobb-Douglas or Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
functions provide limited information about factors such as technical change, 
which usually is proxied either by a time dummy or the intercept in econometric 
analysis.    
 In this paper, we have estimated the determinants of labour productivity in 
Sudan on the basis of the well-known Verdoorn‟s Law, which is known to be a 
less restrictive method with no ambivalence with respect to issues such as 
elasticity of substitution between factors of production, returns to scale and 
technology which predicts a positive and stable relationship between labour 
productivity and cumulative output. This approach does not impose a unitary 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, and it allows for economies 
of scale and technical progress (Verdoorn 1980). This technique provides a 
„roundabout solution‟, as Katz (1968) puts it, to the question of technological 
progress by using expansion in output to reflect  the impact of economies of scale 
and division of labour in production. As output grows, the role of these factors 
grows too. This method has been widely used in the literature and the coefficient 
on output growth was often found positive. For application of Verdoorn‟s Law, 
see Kaldor (1966), McCombie and Ridder (1983), Boulier (1984), Michl (1985), 
Jefferson (1988), Wells and Thirlwall (2003).  
The Verdoorn‟s equation can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas production 
function (see, Rowthorn 1979) or from a CES production function (Katz 1968). 
Following Verdoorn (1980) the relationship between labour productivity and 
output can be written as:     
 
pit = α + β qit + εit             (1)   
 
where p is growth of labour productivity, q is growth of output, α is a constant, β 
is the coefficient on output growth which is expected to be greater than zero and ε 
is the error term.  
 This original Verdoorn equation, however, needs to be modified in view of 
developments in the literature of growth accounting. For example, Rowthorn 
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(1979) criticised the Verdoorn Law on the basis that it did not take into account 
the contribution of physical capital and associated technical progress. The 
emerging literature in the following years recognised the validity of this critique 
and included a capital stock variable in applications (Michl 1988,   McCombie 
and Ridder 1983, Jefferson 1988). 
 Neither does equation (1) make an allowance for the influence of learning by 
doing and education. Siginificance of these have been discussed by scholars of 
different persuasion both from theoretical and empirical points of view (Arrow 
1962; Becker 1962 and 1992; Denison 1967; Bahk and Gort 1993;  Cörvers 1997; 
Engelbrecht 1997; del Barrio-Castro et al. 2002 and Moretti 2004).  
 Moreover, as discussed under Section 3 and Section 4.2, the estimates of 
labour productivity are influenced by capacity utilisation rates.  Jefferson (1988), 
for example, tested the effect of capacity utilisation on labour productivity in his 
application of Verdoorn‟s Law and found it to have a positive and significant 
impact. To reflect on these considerations, a generalised form of equation (1) can 
be written in the following way: 
pit = α + βj Σ Xijt + εit           (2) 
 
where X is the vector of j number of variables that influence labour productivity. 
For empirical estimations, this, then, can be transformed into: 
  
pit = α + β1 qit +  β2 kit  + β3 sit + β4 uit +  εit      (3)   
 
where k, s and u  reflect the impact of capital-labour ratio, skills  and capacity 
utilisation rate on labour productivity, respectively. All coefficients are all 
expected to have positive signs.  
 
4.3.2. Data, Estimations and Results 
 
The estimations are based on the 2001 Comprehensive Industrial Survey with 
ISIC groupings. The survey covered all regions of Sudan, including the South. All 
companies with 10 and more workers and a sample of companies with less than 
10 workers were included in the survey. Estimations are based on four digit 
industry classification with 83 industries altogether. The manufacture of „medical 
appliances and instruments for measuring checking testing and navigating‟ had to 
be excluded as the survey had no capital stock data for this industry. This reduced 
the number of observations to 82. 
Estimations are carried out at levels because the database does not include a 
time series element. All variables are in natural logarithms. Labour productivity is 
measured as value-added per employee. The estimate of the Verdoorn effect is 
based on cumulative industrial output at four-digit  level. Capital-labour ratios are 
based on capital stock data at the end of the year and the number of persons 
engaged in each industry.  
The industrial survey does not include any information on job experience or 
education. Instead, we used a proxy variable to measure the influence of learning 
by doing and education. Assuming a positive association between wages and 
skills, firm level or sectoral wage differentials are likely to reflect the differences 
in education and experience. We used the difference in the average wages 
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between individual sectors and the highest paying sector in order to avoid zero or 
negative values when logarithmic transformation is used. Therefore, the series 
used in estimations reflect the extent of unskilled labour used in production. In 
other words, the higher is the wage differential for a particular sector the lower is 
the amount of  skills used. Hence, the coefficient on s is expected to be negative. 
 
The survey does not include a measure of capacity underutilisation, either. A 
number of methods are devised in the literature to measure capacity utilisation 
rates. For example Basu (1996) used the variation in material inputs on the 
grounds that material inputs do not have variable utilisation rates as factor inputs. 
This approach is impractical for our purposes as it requires panel data that permits 
the estimation of variation in material inputs. Another estimate for capacity 
utilisation is based on the proportion of actual output against potential output. 
While this is a more appropriate measure of capacity utilisation rate, the industrial 
survey did not report the installed capacity or potential output levels either. 
Therefore, we estimated the potential output levels using capital-output ratios 
assuming that a lower capital-output ratio reflects a higher capacity utilisation. 
We categorised establishments according to their industry. Potential output for 
those with similar capital intensities have been estimated with reference to the 
lowest capital output ratio in the same group. One problem with this measure of 
capacity utilisation is that it may capture the effects of efficiency with which 
capital is used. However, this is likely to be the case if the firms operate closer to 
full capacity utilisation. In circumstances where most firms suffer from low 
capacity utilisation levels this measure is likely to be a good proxy.  
 
Table 4 reveals the results by Ordinary Least Squares method of estimation. 
Four different regression equations are run. The first equation reflects the original 
Verdoorn approach. In this, the coefficient on cumulative output is quite large and 
highly significant with the expected positive sign. However, the coefficient of 
determination (R
2
) is very low indicating that if cumulative output is capturing the 
effects of economies  scale or learning by doing it only does so for a limited 
extent. A good proportion of labour productivity remains unexplained by the 
original Verdoorn Equation.  
 
Equation 2 includes capital stock per worker to test for the contribution of 
capital stock and embedded technology to labour productivity. The results show 
that this variable has quite a large and statistically significant influence on the 
labour productivity. Its inclusion improves the explanatory power of the equation 
for labour productivity as reflected by the increased R-squared.  The size of the 
coefficient of output has gone down as one might expect. This is likely to reflect 
that in the previous equation it partially captured the influence of capital stock per 
worker. 
 
Equation 3 includes the variable that measures the extent of the unskilled 
labour used in production. Inclusion of this variable substantially improves the 
size of the coefficient of determination and the explanatory power of the 
regression equation. Improving the labour quality by ten per cent through 
enhancement of skills would increase the labour productivity by seven per cent.  
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 Table 4. Estimated parameters of labour productivity in Sudan  
Independent Variable: Value added 
per worker 
Verdoorn‟s productivity functions  
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Coefficients on regressors 
 C Intercept 3.77 6.94 3.81 
    (4.97) (9.93) (3.58) 
 q Cumulative output  0.50 0.10 0.07 
    (4.20) (1.58) (1.18) 
 k Capital-labour ratio   0.39 0.49 
   
(8.71) (9.94) 
 us Use of unskilled labour   -0.73  -0.65 
       (-9.51) (-8.85) 
u Capacity utilisation rate   
 
0.55 
      
 
(3.71) 
  R
2
 0.21 0.77 0.81 
Diagnostic test statistics 
 
Hausman spefication test  
(t-statistics on residuals ) - 1.58 0.83 
  Heteroskedasticity (1) 0.76 0.67 0.87 
  p- value, Jarque-Bera (2) 0.34 0.62 0.77 
 
Eigenvalues condition no. (3)  - 2.57 4.4 
(1) Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey statistics for heteroskedasticity. X2 critical values at  95% 
significance are 3.84 for df. 1 and 5.99 for df. 2. 
(2) Jarque Berra normality test statistics. Figures in brackets are X2critical values at 95% 
significance. 
(3) This is estimated as the ratio of maximum to minimum Eigenvalue. The statistic is used 
to test for multicollinearity. If between 100-1000 it reflects moderate multicollinearity 
amongst the regressors. 
 
The inclusion of the capacity utilisation rates in the final equation further 
improves the overall explanatory power of the equation and reduces the size of 
the Verdoorn coefficient.  The new variable has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on labour productivity. A ten per cent rise in capacity 
utilisation rate increases labour productivity by 3.3 per cent. The most striking 
result is that controlling for the effects of capacity utilisation increases the 
contribution of capital stock per worker by around 50 per cent from 0.37 to 0.56.  
Summing up the direct affect of capacity utilisation on labour productivity with 
its indirect affect exerted through capital stock we obtain 5.2 per cent 
improvement in labour productivity for every ten per cent improvement in the 
capacity utilisation rates. This is quite a significant result and comparable to the 
contribution of capital stock or skills alone. 
Going back to Table 2, it was reported earlier that the manufacturing value 
added per worker was 5351 US$ per annum in Sudan and 9283 US$ in China. If 
the parameters in equation four are considered, Sudan has to achieve a 50 per cent 
simultaneous  improvement  in the availability  of capital stock per worker, in its 
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skill base and capacity utilisation rates in order to catch up with labour 
productivity levels in China. 
While these results confirm our earlier analysis, there may be some biases in 
our estimations. One problem with the Verdoorn Law is the possibility of 
simultaneity bias known as the identification problem. That is, the possibility that 
output level is determined by labour productivity not vice versa. This issue has 
been pointed out very often in the literature (Rowthorn 1979, Michl 1985, 
Jefforson 1988). Indeed, regressing output on labour productivity produces a 
statistically significant positive coefficient (albeit with low coefficient of 
determination), signalling a cause for concern. Therefore, we applied the 
Hausman procedure to test for simultaneity problem that confirmed the existence 
of this problem in Equation 2. However, this problem disappears in Equations 3 
and 4 as the t-statistics on residuals turns insignificant.   
The diagnostic test statistics show that all four equations are well-behaving 
functions. Statistically, cross sectional data are known to be prone to 
heteroscedasticity. We used Bresuch-Pagan-Godfrey method to test for unequal 
variance in the error terms. The test statistics show that the disturbances of all 
four equations are homoscedastic.  The diagnostic test results do not reveal any 
violation of the normality assumption either.  
A further problem in our estimations could be the presence of 
multicollinearity, that is, there may be a linear correlation amongst some or all of 
the regressors included in each equation. We  estimated Eigenvalues for each 
equation and the results show that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that 
there exists  multicollinearity amongst the regressors. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The discussion and results in this paper reveal two important issues. Labour 
costs are not particularly high in Sudan even in comparison with low-wage Asian 
economies such as India. Hence, it is unlikely that they explain the lack of 
manufacturing competitiveness in Africa as argued by some scholars. The real 
problem in Sudan is very low levels of productivity in the manufacturing sector. 
Our regression estimations of labour productivity underline several crucial 
issues. Firstly, the estimates confirm the validity of our argument that capacity 
utilisation is an important channel through which labour productivity levels are 
determined. According to our estimates 10 per cent rise in the level of capacity 
utilisation rate leads to a 5.2 per cent increase in labour productivity through its 
direct and indirect effects. This suggests that unless factors that cripple capacity 
utilisation rates are tackled in Sudan the development of the sector will remain a 
far-fetched dream. Remedies to acute underutilisation problem can improve the 
competitiveness of Sudanese manufacturing sector significantly. 
Secondly and unsurprisingly the parameter for the skills variable has the 
biggest size in comparison to other parameters.  This suggests that improving the 
skills of the labour force would have considerable positive impact on labour 
productivity.  
Finally, labour productivity in Sudanese manufacturing is positively related to 
the amount of capital stock available to each worker. While this reinforces the 
proposition that enhancement of labour productivity requires an appropriate 
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capital-labour mix the implications of this finding should be explored by further 
research. For example, the dilemma for Sudan, as for some other countries in 
Africa, is that it is neither a labour-surplus nor a capital-abundant economy. Is 
there any conflict between the predominance of micro and small enterprises in the 
manufacturing sector and the absence of „unlimited labour supply‟ as indicated by 
the land-population ratio? Is there a need for greater economies of scale in 
manufacturing? The success of sectors with large scale units –most notably the 
sugar industry– provides some, but not conclusive, evidence. 
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